​First a capitalist uses money to buy commodities sold on the market: the means of production and wage labor. Then, labor power and the means of production interact throughout the labor process to create a commodity to be sold on the market for profit. ​For capitalist relations to be reproduced, the capitalist must use the profit to go through the circuit again and again. In order for the production process to work, there must be the continuous flow of capital.

However, there are problems inherent in capitalist production- particularly class struggle, overproduction and underproduction. 

Class struggle relates to the exploitation of workers inherent in the capitalist system. Capitalism requires profit and profit is achieved through capitalist exploitation of workers. Exploitation is operationalized as surplus labor / necessary labor. Even considering the buying and selling of labor power is done fairly, the worker is still exploited through capitalist requirements for surplus value. Surplus value is made up of relative surplus value and absolute surplus value. Relative surplus value is value arising from shortening the time necessary to produce, but keeping the working day constant. Absolute surplus value is value arising from increasing the time of production by extending the working day. Either way, capitalist surplus value requires labor to work more than necessary to produce. In short, worker/capitalist conflict is inherent in capitalism.

Capitalism also tends towards either overproduction or underproduction. When capitalists face stagnating markets, they must either externalize costs or expand into new markets (Harvey 2010). Overproduction and underproduction is the result of these mechanisms. Overproduction is the result of competitive pressures to devalue labor.  Capitalist accumulation is facilitated by increased exploitation and production. As such, capitalism tends to produce more than social consumption capacities. Capitalism also tends toward underproduction. Underproduction results from capitalist exploitation of environmental resources. Capitalism requires expanding markets and society must continuously increase its production and consumption capacities, depleting natural resources. Additionally, to stimulate profits, capitalists will externalize costs and pollute the environment, eventually destroying the environment in which it is embedded (a.k.a., ecological rift). In short, capitalism destroys the social and environmental conditions necessary for the system to be reproduced. 

In order to perpetuate capitalist relations despite its inherent contradictions, the capitalist superstructure provides support for the economic base. The superstructure is the cultural, legal, ideological, religious and political relations in society. There is a reciprocal relationship between the base and the superstructure- they support each other. For example, property does not exist without a legal concept and property is not necessary for the economic relations of capitalist relations. In conclusion, according to Marxist theory, the political superstructure provides support for the economic base. 

​Neo-Marxists expand upon Marxist theory by explaining just how the political superstructure provides support for the economic base. According to Poulantzas (1973), the state serves the function of mediating class conflict. As such, in order to serve its function, the state must be relatively distinct from a singular class faction. The state maintains relatively autonomy, meaning it is distinct from but embedded within economic relations. As a result, the state has the capacity to support working class interests, while making decisions within capitalist contexts. The question becomes: Considering relative autonomy, how does the political superstructure become reflective of the economic base?

Poulantzas (1973) answers this question by claiming the state becomes reflective of the economic base through power blocs. According to Poulantzas (1973), a power bloc is made up of an alliance between several class factions. Class factions are different segments of capital. Examples of different class factions are the landed class and the merchant class. Several class fractions can politically mobilize to form a power bloc necessary to influence public policy in such a way to reproduce capitalist relations. 

According to Gramsci (1971), capitalists are able to influence the state through cultural hegemony. Hegemony is the ideological predominance of corporate values, norms and beliefs. Cultural hegemony is part of the ideological superstructure, which provides support for the economic base.  Through ideological dominance, capitalists are able to ensure capital relations are reproduced. ​

According to O'Connor (1973) the state has run into fiscal crisis as a result of its attempts to manage capitalist crises. The state tries to manage the inherent contradictions of the capitalist system through social expenditures and social capital spending (O'Connor 1973). Social expenditures are the state's attempt to legitimize the capitalist system and "maintain social harmony" (O'Connor 1973:7). Social capital spending is the state's attempt to stimulate capital accumulation  through social investment (which increases the productivity of labor) and social consumption (which reduces the reproductive costs of labor). Through these efforts, the state helps reproduce capitalist class relations and temporary resolve crises emerging from the inherent contradictions of capitalist production. However, in order to maintain legitimacy, the state must continuously increase expenditures, leading to a fiscal crisis. ​

According to the social structures of accumulation framework (McDonough, Reich and Kotz 2010), institutions supporting capital accumulation are characterized by a life cycle of exploration, consolidation and decay. As such, political institutions go through life cycles of exploration, consolidation and decay. During exploration, groups experiment with different political arrangements which will facilitate capital accumulation. During consolidation, policy and regulation which facilitates capital accumulation becomes institutionalized. During decay, political institutions fail to support capital accumulation and the cycle goes back to the exploration phase- a new institution facilitating capital accumulation will rise and fall. ​

Although liberal corporate policy was implemented after World War II, by the 1970s, a counter-movement developed to roll-back social welfare and deregulate business policy. Deregulation resulted in increased inequality and the financial crisis (Panitch and Konings 2009). According to Mizruchi (2013), deregulation and the decline of liberal corporatism is the result of decreased business unity. By the 1970s, business had successfully attacked regulation, organized labor and the power of the central bank. However, by defeating these forces, corporations lost focus on the long-term stability of the economy as a whole. As a result, factions attempted to manage the fiscal crisis of the state by decreasing social expenditures, leading to increased inequality and social turbulence.

Public policy and the development of state structure is problematic, as it can be used as a tool for business elites to achieve their interests (Woods and Morris 2007), or it can drift from its original purpose (Hacker and Pierson 2010). According to Woods and Morris (2007), state structures helped unify business and exclude opposition groups. Like Woods and Morris (2007), Hacker and Pierson (2010) find organized interests shape public policy. However, whereas Woods and Morris (2007) examine the politics underlying NAFTA, Hacker and Pierson (2010) examine the politics underlying increased social inequality. According to Hacker and Pierson (2010), increased inequality is the result of changes in: (1) financial markets, (2) corporate governance, (3) industrial relations and (4) taxation. Although policy to increase equality was enacted, because of changes caused by corporate actions, policy drift occurred. 

According to the politics of public policy research, welfare policy was degraded through long, purposeful corporate actions. Like Gramsci (1971), research finds hegemony is a key factor influencing social outcomes. Corporations have the power to implement long-term efforts to guide public perceptions and change public opinion from strongly supporting welfare policy, to opposing it. For example, Quadagno (1998) finds public confidence in social security has declined as a result of a long, successful strategy by right-wing opponents. Elites perpetuated "the perversity thesis" which popularized the claim that welfare is a policy which creates incentives for individuals to not be productive members of society (Somers and Block 2005). In short, by influencing ideology, corporations were able to roll-back welfare reforms.

In addition, deregulation and public-private partnerships have been able to shift New Deal policy away from focus on the welfare of citizens and towards emphasis on economic growth. For example, Molotch (1998) found HUD was co-opted by capitalist growth machines. HUD now works through private partnerships which decide where and how to build, resulting in increased inequality (Molotch 1998). In conclusion, although social welfare policies were implemented following World War II, due to capitalist efforts, welfare policies have eroded, increasing social inequality.

​Neoliberalism is a dominant ideology perpetuating inequality around the entire world. According to Harvey (2012:6): "The neoliberal turn has restored class power to rich elites." Neoliberalism is an ideology which claims the most amount of wealth accumulates through free market fundamentalism. However, neoliberalism goes beyond liberal economics by pushing for the financialization of everything. As a result, the state has set in motion international policy aimed to expedite market liberalization around the world (Harvey 2007).

Drawing from Poulantzas and the social structures of accumulation framework, public policy research demonstrates how neoliberalism is a historical ideological structure which emerged to support capital accumulation (Prechel and Harms 2007). According to Prechel and Harms (2007), neoliberalism is an ideology which emerged out of the interests of a historically contingent power bloc. During the decay-exploration social structures of accumulation transition, the power bloc politically mobilized to implement neoliberal policy in order to better accumulate capital. 

Public policy research demonstrates how neoliberalism and the state has facilitated the development of the global financial real estate market which contributed to the recent global financial crisis (Gotham 2006). According to Gotham (2006), the state shapes global capital flows; specifically, influenced by neoliberal ideology, the state facilitated the financialization of local real estate through the expansion of mortgage-backed securities and real estate investment trusts (REITs). In an attempt to stimulate capital accumulation, decision makers aimed to de-localized property and place local real estate into the global financial market.  Although this increased the power of the economic elite, neoliberal policy has not been effective at revitalizing capital accumulation (Harvey 2007). Influenced by neoliberalism, public policy provided support for the development of REITs and mortgage-backed securities which eventually resulted in the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. In short, capitalist hegemony influences state policy in such a way that increases capitalist power at the extreme detriment of others around the world. 

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Gotham, Kevin. 2006. “The Secondary Circuit of Capital Reconsidered: Globalization and the U.S. Real Estate Crisis.” American Journal of Sociology 112:231–275.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from Prison Notebooks. New York, NY: International Publishers.

Hacker, Jacob and Paul Pierson. 2010. “Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States.” Politics and Society 38:152–204.

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Harvey, David. 2012. Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution. New York, NY: Verso. ​

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Jenkins, J. Craig and Barbara Brents. 1989. “Social Protest, Hegemonic Competition, and social Reform: A Political Struggle Interpretation of the Origins of the American Welfare State.”  American Sociological Review 54:891–909.

Marx, Karl. [1867] 1976. Capital: Volume I. London, UK: Penguin Books.

McDonough, Terrence, Michael Reich, and David M. Kotz, ed. 2010. Contemporary Capitalism and Its Crisis: Social Structure of Accumulation Theory for the 21st Century. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Mizruchi, Mark. 2013. The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Molotch, Harvey. 1998. “Urban America.” Pp. 53–71 in Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda, edited by Clarence Y.H. Lo and Michael Schwarz. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

O’Connor, James. 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York, NY: St. Martin’s.

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Quadagno, Jill. 1998. “Social Security Policy and the Entitlement Debate: The New American Exceptionalism.” Pp. 95–117 in Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda, edited by Clarence Y.H. Lo and Michael Schwarz. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Somers, Margaret and Fred Block. 2005. “From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate.” American Sociological Review 70:260–287.

Woods, Tim and Theresa Morris. 2007. “Fast Tracking Trade Policy: State Structures and NGO Influence During the NAFTA Negotiations.” Pp. 177–204 in Politics and Globalization: Research in Political Sociology, Vol. 15, edited by Harland Prechel. Oxford, UK: Elsevier.

Ever since Polanyi (1994) demonstrated the economy cannot be considered an entity separate from society, research has focused on embeddedness. Studies have revealed the effects of embeddedness on the internal organization of individual corporations, the network of organizations, the behavior of institutional fields and the political action of economic elites. Embeddedness is a critical line of research as it is related to organizational efficiency and major social problems, like organizational wrongdoing and economic collapse. 

Embeddedness is the way individuals and organizations are constrained by social relations, such that they cannot be viewed as distinct entities (Granovetter 1985). This means that social relations are a critical aspect of economic behavior. As such, embeddedness examines the effect of embeddedness on the behavior of organizations by focusing on the social network.  

Social networks can be considered to be made up of either few or many structural holes. Social networks with few structural holes have numerous social relations which overlap. On the other hand, social networks with numerous structural holes have little redundancy between actors. Social networks influence the position of economic actors. As such, it is a critical factor when studying economic behavior.

The social embeddedness of economic actors plays a function. Functions of embeddedness include: facilitating innovation through joint problem solving (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 1996), regulating social behavior and facilitating trust (Crutchley, Jensen and Marshall 2007), managing uncertainty (Podolny 2001), and providing information and understanding of the environment (Uzzi 1997).

Social networks provide economic actors with the capacity to have flexible working groups, better capable of innovation. Powell, Koput and Smith-Doer (1996) find when knowledge base is complex and expanding, innovation occurs within networks rather than individual firms. Social networks facilitate learning and knowledge. When knowledge is complex and expanding, it is difficult for knowledge to be obtained within the rigid, single organization. Knowledge is created within a community made up of a social network of individuals and organizations. As such, a social network is an effective vehicle for learning. Individuals within the social network can join to solve problems faced by the community, facilitating innovation. 

Embeddedness is a critical aspect of economic behavior as economic exchange requires trust. Embeddedness serves the function of regulating social behavior and ensuring trust. Organizations with little embeddedness are more likely to exploit information asymmetries and act wrongfully, as embeddedness regulates social behavior. For example, Crutchley, Jensen and Marshall (2007) found when outsiders are less involved in an audit committee, accounting fraud is more likely to occur. With little involvement from external actors, the audit committee is less pressured to cause problems within the organization by pointing out possible problematic activity. In short, economic embeddedness regulates behavior to ensure trust.

Embeddedness also serves the function of managing uncertainty by providing information and understanding of the environment (Uzzi 1997). Particular social relations facilitate the management of different types of uncertainties. Structural holes are more beneficial and social status less beneficial in environments characterized by egocentric uncertainty (Podolny 2001). Egocentric uncertainty is the uncertainty of the focal actor in efficiently producing a commodity that will be desirable by exchange partners. By having numerous structural holes, organizations can have a broader reach and better obtain information about the broader market. Structural holes are less beneficial and social status more beneficial in environments characterized by altercentric uncertainty (Podolny 2001). Altercentric uncertainty is the uncertainty of exchange partners in the quality of the commodity brought to the market. Status provides a way for external actors to judge the likelihood that the commodity will be of good quality based on collective interpretations. Market uncertainty influences the value of particular social positions: network position and social status.  

Embeddedness affects the internal organization of individual corporations. For example, Castilla (2011) found that embeddedness effects social inequality in organizations.  Managerial assessment of employees is affected by: (1) the social network of past and current managers, (2) the similarity between past and current managers, and (3) the social similarity between the manager and the employee. As such, individual advancement in an organization is related to the individual's social network and status. This results in inequality in organizations, where those in positions of power all have similar characteristics and social networks. 

Embeddedness affects the network of organizations- how organizations are related to each other. The economic position of the organization in the network is not related to things the individual organizations control. Instead, it is the result of how the organization compares to others, the actions of others and its status (MacKay and Phillips 2005). 

Embeddedness also affects the behavior of institutional fields. According to Stearns and Allan (1996), economic behavior (mergers) is not because of efficiency, but institutional embeddedness. A permissive state allows those on the fringe to innovate which facilitates mergers. Merger waves occur when those actors are viewed as successful and others imitate. 

Embeddedness affects the political action and power of economic elites. Classwide rationality (a major factor contributing to the power of the economic elite) is related to the way economic actors are included in diffuse social networks (Useem 1982). Furthermore, capitalist PAC contributions are related to regulatory embeddedness, social status and network position (Burris 2005). In short, the political action of economic actors is not just affected by rational economic reasoning, but social embeddedness.

However, the extent to the effect of social embeddedness on corporate behavior is not constant over time. According to Mizruchi, Stearns and Marquis (2006), the effect of social embeddedness is historically contingent. The effect of social network on corporate behavior has declined over time due to the following factors: (1) professionalization of finance, (2) internalization of financial and (3) increased market volatility.  

Embeddedness is related to organizational efficiency. For example, embeddedness is related to the cost of capital (Uzzi 1999). At the dyad level, firms with strong social ties with their lender get the lowest rate. At the network level, firms with a network of embedded and arms-length ties get the lowest rate. However, embeddedness is beneficial only up to a certain extent (Uzzi 1997). Embedded ties help distill information when time is of importance. However, too many embedded ties can decrease efficiency. Furthermore, embeddedness can lead to the development of broader social problems.

Embeddedness relates to broader social problems, like corporate fraud and the financial crisis. For example, Prechel and Morris (2010) found political and organizational embeddedness created dependence, opportunities and incentives for individuals to commit financial malfeasance.  Although embeddedness is related to major economic problems, this can be empowering. Once the underlying social arrangements are identified, they can be rearranged to improve the problem. This is why Abolafia (2010) emphasizes the need to fix academic, political and regulatory structures to ensure we do not have another financial crisis. Economic structures can be fixed by also fixing the institutions in which the economic structures are embedded. 

Embeddedness effects a range of factors including corporate and institutional behavior and market relations and outcomes. However, the effect of social embeddedness on corporate behavior is not constant- it varies over time (Mizruchi, Stearns and Marquis 2006). As such, future research should reveal precisely which conditions relate to the effect of embeddedness on organizations. ​

​Abolafia, Mitchel. 2010. “The Institutional Embeddedness of Market Failure: Why Speculative Bubbles Still Occur.” Research in the Sociology of Organizations 30B:177–200.

Burris, Val. 2005. “Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites.” American Journal of Sociology 111:249–283.

Castillia, Emilio. 2011. “Bringing Managers Back In: Managerial Influences on Workplace Inequality.” American Sociological Review 76:667–694.

Crutchley, Claire, Marlin Jensen, and Beverly Marshall. 2007. “Climate for Scandal: Corporate Environments that Contribute to Accounting Fraud.” The Financial Review 42:53–73.

Granovetter, Mark. 1985. “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology 91:481–510.

MacKay, Peter and Gordon M. Phillips. 2005. “How Does Industry Affect Firm Financial Structure?” The Review of Financial Studies 18:1433–1466.

Mizruchi, Mark, Linda Brewster Stearns and Christopher Marquis. 2006. “The Conditional Nature of Embeddedness: A Study of Borrowing by Large U.S. Firms, 1973–1994.” American Sociological Review 64:310–333.

Podolny, Joel. 2001. “Networks as the Pipes and Prisms of the Market.” American Journal of Sociology 107:33–60.

Polanyi, Karl. [1944] 2001. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Powell, Walter, Kenneth Koput, and Laurel Smith-Doerr. 1996. “Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation.” Administrative Science Quarterly 41:116–145.

Prechel, Harland and Theresa Morris. 2010. “The Effects of Organizational and Political Embeddedness on Financial Malfeasance in the Largest U.S. Corporations: Dependence, Incentives and Opportunities.” American Sociological Review 75:331–354.

Stearns, Linda Brewster and Kenneth D. Allan. 1996. “Economic Behavior in Institutional Environments: The Corporate Merger Wave of the 1980s.” American Sociological Review 61:699–718.

Useem, Michael. 1982. “Classwide Rationality in the Politics of Managers and Directors of Large American Corporations in the U.S. and Great Britain.” Administrative Science Quarterly 27:199–226.

Uzzi, Brian. 1997. “Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness.” Administrative Science Quarterly 42:35–67.

Uzzi, Brian. 1999. “Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing.” American Sociological Review 64:481–505.

​The holding company operates as a financial management company. It does not produce commodities itself. Instead it owns controlling stock of multiple relatively-autonomous, legally-distinct production companies.

The rise of the holding company is the result of a split between the ownership and control of organizations (Berle and Means 1932). In the United States, the first corporations emerged in the 1800s, mainly for public goods. It was traditionally a private organization, held by a small set of owners who control the organization. However, in order to internally develop funds, companies would sell their stock to the public. The dispersion of ownership is inherent in the modern corporation (Berle and Means 1932). As the size of the corporation increases, ownership becomes more diffused. The dispersion of ownership has facilitated the dominance of the holding company, especially after the Civil War.

The holding company came to rise in post Civil War during the antebellum period, especially in regards to the growth of railroad corporations (Berle and Means 1932). During this period of time, the holding company attempted to vertically integrate and ownership became increasingly centralized and concentrated. This lead to the rise of the large corporation and the establishment of monopolies (Berle and Means 1932). Although ownership became centralized through strategies of vertical integration, the holding company had problems with control (Fligstein 1985). The holding company facilitated a house of cards such that, once problems with control came to fuition and the holding company became bankrupt, the whole economy failed. This ended up leading to the Great Depression and the state’s response: the New Deal (Prechel 2000). The New Deal broke up the holding company.

​The Celler-Kefauver Amendment was enacted in 1950 because people were weary of the increasing size of organizations and their influence on the market due to the Great Depression.  The Celler-Kefauver Amendment limited vertical integration, forcing organizations to diversify in order to grow. Furthermore, in response to problems with the holding company, corporations developed a structure which would provide both flexibility and control. As such, the MDF was developed. In short, the MDF rose along with the diversification of product lines (Fligstein 1985).

The MDF consists of a single company who has a central headquarters and and multiple relatively-autonomous departments for different product lines or regions. Whereas in the holding company, those with decision making authority are within a legally separate organization, those with decision making power in the MDF are located within the company at central headquarters.

​Neo-liberalism came to rise in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Neo-liberalism is an ideology that promotes the free market claiming corporations should not be restrained in pursuing their self interest. This ideology led to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 which eliminated tax transfers within subsidiaries of a holding company. This has wide spread implications because it eliminated the tax and reporting of transfers within subsidiaries, which eliminated the costs associated with the subsidiary structure (Prechel 1997). Furthermore, it provided companies with an opportunity to internally raise capital (Prechel 2000). The MLSF’s ability to internally raise capital became a vital incentive throughout the 1970s. As such, the MLSF has become and continues to be the dominant corporate form in the United States.

The MLSF is similar to the holding company. However, the MLSF has the organizational capacity to financially manage the subsidiaries whereas the holding company’s subsidiaries functioned more autonomously. Additionally, the MLSF structure is much more complex than the holding company.Whereas the holding company consisted of two layers: the holding company and its productive subsidiaries, the MLSF can consist of numerous layers and subsidiaries can operate as holding companies. This change has facilitated financial malfeasance, as it creates a liability firewall between parent companies and subsidiaries (Prechel and Morris 2010).

Economic theory assumes decisions in organizations are made by rational actors in an attempt to increase efficiency. Furthermore, they assume profits represent efficiency (Perrow 1986). According to economic theorists, organizations are the embodiment of value-based contracts. Contracts are the mechanisms for transactions. Organizations are established to reduce the transaction costs of organized social activity (Coase 1937). In short, according to economic theory, corporate structure is organized in such a way to minimize transaction costs.

From the perspective of economic theory, changes in corporate form from the holding company to the MDF to the MLSF is the result of actions motivated by efficiency. Certain corporate structures fit best with particular corporate strategies (Chandler 1962). According to Chandler (1962), the rise of the MDF is the result of a shift in corporate strategy. Corporate strategy shifted away from vertical integration and towards diversification. The holding company was a better fit for vertical integration strategies, as it centralized control of the entire production process (something beneficial when pursuing vertical integration). On the other hand, MDF is a better fit for diversification strategies, as it decentralized control and increases the adaptability and flexibility of the company (something beneficial when pursuing diversification). Change in corporate form is the result of changes in corporate strategy, which requires a new structure to be efficient.

Although economic theory provides an explanation of changes in corporate structure, it is inadequate. Economic theorists assume the behavior of individuals is rational and purely related to economic interests. As such, economic theorists tend to ignore the complexities of organizations and overlook motives for the behavior of individuals in organization, such as professional norms and political power (Perrow 1986). Furthermore, empirical research does not support economic theory claims that changes in corporate structure are related to efficiency and productivity (Roy 1997).

Whereas economic theory ignores political power, political theory focuses on it. Political theory challenges economic theory assumptions that corporate behavior is due to efficiency. From the political theory perspective, individual decisions are more related to power than efficiency. Organizational behavior is explained as a result of powerful coalitions aiming to reduce uncertainty by interacting with their environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

According to economic theory, organizations change as a result of conflict over resources and changing power relations. Corporate change is the result of corporate attempts to overcome constraints to capital accumulation (Prechel 1994). In an attempt to ensure its survival, organizations will behave in ways to reduce their uncertainty, whether this be through (1) political lobbying of the state, or (2) placing individuals with perceived capacities to better deal face critical uncertainties into leadership positions. Changes in organizational form can be the result of either of this two responses to the uncertainty facing organizations due to resource dependence.

In conflict over critical resources, corporations will lobby the state to change public policy to better suit their interests, facilitating changes in corporate form. For example, in the 1970s, due to globalization, corporations became financially constrained and faced difficulty raising capital (Prechel and Boies 1998). As such, corporations politically mobilized, leading to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated the costs of the subsidiary structure created after the great depression. Changes in state structure initiated by corporate actors provided an opportunity for companies to change to the MLSF. Futhermore, the MLSF decreased corporate uncertainty and resource dependence by allowing corporations to internally raise capital, creating incentives for companies to adopt the MLSF (Prechel 1997). In an attempt to better accumulate capital, corporate actors worked together to pressure the state to change regulations, creating opportunities and incentives for corporate structure to change.

According to political theorists, change in corporate structure is also the result of power shifts. The characteristics of those who control the organizations tend to change over time, depending on who is conceived to best handle organizational uncertainties. As individuals rise in power, they act in ways to ensure their power is maintained. For example, when companies pursue diversification strategies, finance is viewed as a critical contingency and finance professionals are placed into positions of power (Zorn 2004). Upon gaining power, individuals with a background in finance use their position to structure the company in a way that allows growth through diversification, thus ensuring their power is maintained (Fligstein 1985). In short, according to political theory, changes in corporate structure are the result of power dynamics.

Political theory is a strong perspectivive explaining the political dimensions associated with organizational which has an ample amount of empirical support. For example, there is empirical evidence supporting political theory's claim that factors such as political action, capital dependence and financial risk are related to the adoption of the MLSF (Boies and Prechel 2002; Prechel and Boies 1998; Prechel, Boies and Woods 1999). However in an event-history model of MDF adoption, Palmer, Jennings and Zhou (1993) found little support for the straightforward political view (form prevalence and CEO prior sales experience was more related to change in corporate form than CEO financial expertise and ownership network), while finding significant support for institutional theory perspectives.

Institutional theories center around how the institutional environment impacts organizational behavior. From this perspective institutional isomorphism primarily determines corporate behavior. Institutional isomorphism is the process by which organizations tend to become similar to their institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell 2007). Isomorphism can occur through three different processes: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 2007). Coercive isomorphism stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; they are forced to change due to cultural expectations of competitors, suppliers, consumers or the state. For example, changes in state regulation after the Great Depression forced corporations to eliminate structural monopolies. Mimetic isomorphism results from standard responses to uncertainty; they are pressured to mimic other prestigious organizations. For example, a company that is struggling may see how other more successful companies have a different structure and will attempt to replicate their success and adopt a new corporate form. Normative isomorphism is associated with professionalism; they tend to follow a professional world view. For example, business schools may emphasize the benefits of the MLSF, promoting companies to change their form to that which is idealized in business school. In short, according to institutional theory, change in corporate form is the result of institutional isomorphism.

Whereas political theory views corporations as political actors attempting to increase control of their environment, institutional theory conceptualizes corporations as institutional actors responding to environmental pressures. From this perspective, in an attempt to secure legitimacy from external actors, corporations do not attempt to change their institutional environment, instead, they conform to it. As such, it fails to explain corporate political actions to change state regulation, facilitating a change in corporate structure.

Systematic research also provides evidence in support for insitutitional theories. For example, Palmer, Jennings and Zhou (1993) found institutional factors, such as the prevalence of the MDF in the industry, CEO background at elite business schools, and directional and nondirectional ties to other MDF firms, explained corporate adoption of the MDF better than political and economic factors. However, institutional theory is limited as it does not adequately conceptualize organizations as powerful political actors. Institutionalism tends to focus on normative and mimetic pressures while ignoring coercion (Mizruchi and Fein 1999). Furthermore, it focuses on how organizations become increasingly similar and does not adequately explain differences among organizations. In conclusion, institutional theory views individuals and organizations as relatively passive and minimizes the importance of agency and heterogeneity.

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Fligstein, Neil. 1985. “The Spread of the Multidivisional Form among Large Firms, 1919–1979.” American Sociological Review 50:377–391.

Mizruchi, Mark and Lisa Fein. 1999. “The Social Construction of Organizational Knowledge: A study of the Uses of Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative Isomorphism. Administrative Science Quarterly 44:653–683.

Palmer, Donald, P. Devereaux Jennings, and Xueguang Zhou. 1993. “Late Adopting of the Multidivisional Form by Large Corporations.” Administrative Science Quarterly 38:100–131.

Perrow, Charles. 1986. Complex Organizations, 3rd Edition. New York: Random House.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Gerald R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper and Row.

Prechel, Harland. 1994. “Economic Crisis and the Centralization of Control over the Managerial Process: Corporate Restructuring and Neo-Fordist Decision Making.” American Sociological Review 59:723–745.

Prechel, Harland. 1997. “Corporate Transformation to the Multilayered Subsidiary Form: Changing Economic Conditions and State Business Policy.” Sociological Forum 12:405–439.

Prechel, Harland. 2000. Big Business and the State: Historical Transitions and Corporate Transformation, 1880s–1990s. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Prechel, Harland and John Boies. 1998. “Capital Dependence, Financial Risk, and Change from the Multidivisional to the Multilayered Subsidiary Form.” Sociological Forum 13:321–362.

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Prechel, Harland and Theresa Morris. 2010. “The Effects of Organizational and Political Embeddedness on Financial Malfeasance in the Largest U.S. Corporations: Dependence, Incentives and Opportunities.” American Sociological Review 75:331–354.

Roy, William. 1997. Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Zorn, Dirk. 2004. “Here a Chief, There a Chief: The Rise of the CFO in the American Firm.” American Sociological Review 69:345–364.

Whereas early organizational theory conceptualized organizations as systems closed to their external environment, Selznick's (1966) analysis of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) demonstrates organizations can never fully achieve closure. Organizations require continuity, homogeneity and consent, which creates a need for a set of formal and informal relations internal to the organization. However, organizations have to respond to their institutional environment, which is the result of the organizations own activities and the activities of external groups. In fact, organizations can deviate from their intended purpose due to the institutional environment. Selznick found that although the TVA intended to have grass roots democratic administrative structure, attempts of democracy were negated due to pressures from the institutional environment. In his analysis, Selznick examines exactly how this process occurred. 

The institutional environment is the rules, regulations and norms to which organizations must abide in order to maintain legitimacy and support. For example, in order for a dental practice to be viewed as legitimate and survive here in town, the dentist must abide by a set of internal and external institutional norms, like having a building, providing employees with a salary, dressing professionally and dentist accreditation. However,according to Selznick's institutionalism, the institutional environment is not some abstract entity, autonomous from individuals. People run institutions and organize them in ways to better achieve their interests (Stinchcombe 1997).

According to institutional theory, organizations change as a result of coersive pressures from the institutional environment. The institutional environment molds organizations through cooptation through both formal and informal mechanisms. According to Selznick (1966:13): "Cooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structures of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence." Cooptation can occur theory formal or informal means. Formal cooptation occurs when the process of absorbing new elements into leadership is public. An example of formal cooptation is a change in official appointments to key posts.  Formal cooptation is associated with problems of legitimacy for the ruling group. Informal cooptation, on the other hand, occurs when the process of absorbing new elements into leadership is private. Informal cooptation is associated with pressure from powerful groups in the external environment. For example, although it was intended to be a grassroots administration, preexisting agricultural institutions were able to influence the decisions of the TVA, and create a constituency relationship between land-grant colleges and the Agricultural Relations Department of the TVA. Tensions between the formal structures of the organization and institutional power resulted in cooptation and a deviation from its intended purpose. 

Institutional theory is a significant study in the field of organizational sociology, as it forced researchers to include the environment in their analysis. Institutional theory demonstrates how organizations can “take a life of their own” despite the will of organizational leaders. This advanced the field of organizational studies by moving research beyond the closed system approach and viewing organizations as systems open to the external environment. 

Like institutional theory, population ecology is an open systems theory that includes the environment in its analysis. Population ecology primarily ask the question: why do some organizations survive and other fails. However, whereas Selznick's institutional theory included individuals and group behavior in his analysis, population ecology does not. Population ecology analysis is conducted at the population level. From this perspective, a population is a group of similar organizations. For example, a population could be oil and gas production companies or independent breweries. Population ecology analyzes the effect of population characteristics on organizational outcomes. For example, how does the number and age of oil and gas production companies or independent breweries relate to the survival rate of the population. However, by focusing on the population, population ecology minimizes the importance of individuals, groups and organizations as social actors. 

According to population ecology, organizations are determined by their external environment. Organizations that best fit the environment survive and others fail (Hannan and Freeman 1977). From the population ecology perspective, organizations go through three stages: variation, selection and retention. Throughout the stage of variation, organizations within the population implement and try out different mechanisms. At this stage, organizations are loosely coupled, meaning that they are made up of loose, flexible relations. As organizations develop over time, they become more tightly coupled and less adaptable to change (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Selection is a process in which organizations are selected by the environment. From this perspective, organizations with a superior fit with the environment succeed; those with a poor fit fail.  Additionally, the selection process favors organizations which have developed concrete organizational structures that are difficult to change (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Retention is the stage where some organizations with certain structures grow while others do not. However, once they arrive at the retention phase, organizations are tightly coupled with a structure made up of many inflexible relationships. Organizations face constraints limiting them from changing their structure and adapting to the external environment. As such, population ecology minimizes the importance of individual organizational change and adaption (Singh and Lumsden 1990). 

Like institutional theory, population ecology accounts for the importance of legitimacy for organizations to survive. From the population ecology perspective, the selection process favors organizations with legitimacy and institutional support (Sing and Lumsden 1990). Furthermore, legitimacy is affected by population density. Legitimacy is low when a new organizational form first emerges and becomes increasingly legitimate as the population density expands (Hannan and Carrol 1995). Although Hannan and Carrol (1995) claim their is no inconsistency between institutional and population ecology arguments, the two perspectives are different. Whereas institutional theory accounts for group influence on what is determined legitimate, population ecology assumes legitimacy is purely the result of population size (Baum and Powell 1995). 

There are both strengths and weaknesses associated with the population ecology view of organizational environments. One of the strengths of population ecology is that it shows how organizations are constrained by their environment (Hannan and Freeman 1984). This forces researchers to address issues of the environment when developing organizational theory. However, although population ecology promotes researchers to address the environment, it takes on the extreme view of environmental determinism. Population ecology just explains how environments influence organizations; it does now explain how organizations influence their environments. Furthermore, by viewing organizations as passive agents, population ecology fails to explain change among individual organizations. Instead, it sees single organizations as relatively stable and change as something that occurs primarily at the population level, as a result of the environmental selection process (not variation within organizations). However, there is ample evidence of individual companies making dramatic changes to their structure and taking action to influence their institutional environment. For example, over the course of time, General Motors has dramatically changed its organizational structure and it has used political pressure to influence public policy in such a way that ensures its survival. In conclusion, population ecology is problematic, as it fails to account for these empirical events. It leaves out organizations and individuals as social actors and fails to explain change within organizations.

Whereas institutional theory and population ecology examine how environments shape organizations, resource dependence theory specifically addresses question of how organizations interact with their environment and how resources are collected and distributed in organizations. Organizations must interact with their external environment in order to obtain the resources necessary for organizational survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). However, unlike population ecology, resource dependence theory does not view the organization as a passive actor. Resource dependence theory claims that organizations act interact with their environment and attempt to shape it to increase their environmental fit (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976). In short, from the resource dependence perspective, organizations both are shaped by and shape their external environment. 

According to resource dependence theory, organizations are not essentially cooperative; instead they are characterized by conflict over power and resources. Organizations are made up of coalitions with multiple and competing interests. As such, conflict and instability is embedded within organizations. Since organizations are dependent upon resources controlled by their environment, they are uncertain of their survival. Those who are seen to best manage critical uncertainties are able to have power in organizations. As such, as ideas about the critical uncertainties facing an organization shift, so does power in organizations. Groups attempt to acquire power by decreasing capital dependence, and controlling critical resources and information systems. Organizational change is the result of competing groups exercising power in an attempt to decrease uncertainty and increase power and control.

Resource dependence theory contradicts population ecology explanations of the factors contributing to organizational survival. Whereas population ecology relates survival rates to population characteristics like population density, resource dependence theory relates survival rates to an organization's position within the resource dependence network. For example, population ecology would claim corporate takeovers are the result of problems with legitimacy and organizational fit (e.g., a small organizational size, and low return on equity). On the other hand, resource dependence would claim it is the result of resource dependence relations (e.g., structural autonomy, organizational constraint on others and both indirect and direct interlocks). Palmer, Barber, Zhou and Soysal (1995) conduct an empirical analysis testing the explanatory power of the competing theories. They found resource dependence perspectives receive more empirical support (Palmer, Barber, Zhou and Soysal 1995). 

Resource dependence theory is a strong, influential theory which accounts for power relations within and between organizations (Davis and Cobb 2010). Unlike population ecology, resource dependence theory recognizes organizations as powerful social actors. Organizations are characterized as political entities characterized by competition and complexity. Organizational goals are not always singular or clear. The dominance of particular goals in organizations is the result of power relations. In conclusion, resource dependence theory provides a stepping stone to understand the influence of power on organizational behavior. 

Institutional theory also incorporates the environment into their analysis. Specifically, it addresses how institutionalized myths and beliefs affect organizational behavior.  Like resource dependence theory, neo-institutionalism asserts organizations are dependent upon their external environment to survive. Organizational needs for legitimacy, stability and material resources are influenced by the external environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Community values and norms affect resource access, which in turn influence the organization's development. As such, institutionalized myths and beliefs are critical factors determining organizational outcomes.

According to neo-institutionalism, organizational behavior is not the effect of rationally calculated action, but the result of taken-for-granted, institutionalized myths (Davis, Diekmann and Tinsley 1994). Institutional myths are stories and explanations which take on a rule-like status governing human behavior (Meyer and Rowan 1977). For example, an institutional myth in the United States is that an architect must be licensed to be effective, and as a result, if all other things are held constant, individuals, with rule-like status, will choose to hire a licensed architect over a non-licensed one. As such, architects are obligated to become and stay licensed. In conclusion, organizations are pressured to incorporate institutionalized myths into their formal structure to increase their legitimacy and survival capacities. 

Like population ecology, neo-institutionalism focuses on continuity and similarities among organizations and fails to adequately explain organizational change. From this perspective, as organizations develop, they are less likely to change as the field becomes increasingly stable. According to neo-institutionalism, organizations face isomorphic pressures. Isomorphism is how institutional myths constrain organizations and force them to become increasingly homogeneous. Isomorphism has a major influence on organizations. According to Meyer and Rowan (1977:538): "Isomorphism with environmental institutions has some major consequences for organizations: (a) they incorporate elements which are legitimated externally, rather than in terms of efficiency; (b) they employ external or ceremonial assessment criteria to define the value of structural elements, and (c) dependence on externally fixed institutions reduced turbulence and maintains stability.  As a result, it is argued here, institutional isomorphism promotes the success and survival of organizations." In short, the selection process favors organizations which are similar to their institutional environment due to isomorphic pressures. As organizational fields develop, organizations which survive within the field tend to become increasingly simular. As such, neo-institutionalism fails to adequately explain differentiation and change among organizations. 

According to neo-institutionalism, institutional myths influence organizations through mimetic, normative and coercive isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Mimetic isomorphism is how organizations tend to become increasingly similar as a result of standard responses to uncertainty. For example, it can be argued that due to the success of Kinder Morgan, oil and gas distribution companies facing uncertainty mimicked the prestigious company and began to adopt the Master Limited Partnership organizational structure. Normative isomorphism is how organizations tend to become increasingly similar as a result of professionalization. For example, a psychiatrist will prescribe medication over natural remedies to manage depression due to American Psychiatric Association best practices and standards learned at professional conferences. On the other hand, coercive isomorphism is the result of political action and the coercive authority of groups. For example, political action may result in environmental regulations to which organizations are forced to conform. In short, according to neo-institutionalism, organizational behavior and change is a result of particular mimetic, normative and coercive institutional pressures.  However, in a study of change among private liberal art colleges, Kraatz and Zajac (1996) found little support for neo-institutional arguments: schools become increasingly different over time and do not mimic prestigious organizations in their field. As such, neo-institutional theory does not adequately explain how organizations respond and adapt to their institutional environment. 

The assumptions and claims of neo-institutional theories come with their own set of strengths and weaknesses. Neo-institutionalism accounts for the institutional environment. However, this element is often taken to the extreme, such that it fails to account for individuals. Whereas institutional theory focuses on how individuals use coercive pressures to attempt to organize the institutional environment in a way that better achieves their interests, neo-institutionalism tends to emphasize mimetic pressures and ignore coercive ones (Mizruchi and Fein 1999). Like population ecology, neo-institutional theories make the fault of studying society without studying people and minimize the importance of how groups use power to better achieve their interests at the expense of others.

​Aldrich, Howard E. and Jeffrey Pfeffer. 1976. “Environments of Organizations.” Annual Review of Sociology 2:79–105.

Baum, Joel A.C. and Walter W. Powell. 1995. “Cultivating an Institutional Ecology of Organizations: Comment on Hannan, Carroll, Dundon, and Torres.” American Sociological Review 60:529–538.

Davis, Gerald and Adam Cobb. 2010. “Resource Dependence Theory: Past and Future.” Pp. 21-42 in Stanford’s Organization Theory Renaissance, 1970-2000. Bingley, NY: Emerald Group.

Davis, Gerald F., Kristina A. Diekmann, and Catherine H. Tinsley. 1994. “The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form.” American Sociological Review 59:547–570.

DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American Sociological Review 48:147–160.

Hannan, Michael T. and Glenn R. Carroll. 1995. “Theory Building and Cheap Talk about Legitimation: Reply to Baum and Powell.” American Sociological Review 60:539–544.

Hannan, Michael and John Freeman. 1977. “The Population Ecology of Organizations.”  American Journal of Sociology 82:929–964.

Hannan, Michael and John Freeman. 1984. “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change.” American Sociological Review 49:149–164.

Kraatz, Matthew S. and Edward J. Zajac. 1996. “Exploring the Limits of the New Institutionalism: The Causes and Consequences of Illegitimate Organizational Change.” American Sociological Review 61:812–836.

Meyer, John and Brian Rowan. 1977. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83:340–363.

Mizruchi, Mark and Lisa Fein. 1999. “The Social Construction of Organizational Knowledge: A study of the Uses of Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative Isomorphism. Administrative Science Quarterly 44:653–683.

Palmer, Donald, Brad Barber, Xueguang Zhou, and Yasemin Soysal. 1995. “The Friendly and Predatory Acquisitions of Large U.S. Corporations in the 1960s: The Other Contested Terrain. American Sociological Review 60:469–499.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Gerald R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper and Row.

Selznick, Philip. 1966. TVA and the Grass Roots. New York: Harper and Row.

Singh, Jitendra V. and Charles J. Lumsden. 1990. “Theory and Research in Organizational Ecology.” Annual Review of Sociology 16:161-195.

Stinchcombe, Arthur. 1997. “On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism.” Annual Review of Sociology 23:1–28.

Key concepts in early organizational theory are rationality, effectiveness, efficiency and control. Max Weber’s conception of formal rationality, scientific management, human relations theory, and decision-making theory each address issues of rationality, effectiveness, efficiency and control in organizations. However, the different theories do not make the same assumptions, leading theorists to different claims of how organizations work and their affects on individual behavior. 

Formal rationality, scientific management, human relations theory and decision making theory each address issues of rationality, effectiveness, efficiency and control in organizations. Before explaining the similarities and differences between the different theories, I will first define key concepts.
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Organizations are purposeful collective action structures. This means that organizations are made up of multiple individuals working together to accomplish a goal. How they work together to achieve a goal depends on organizational structure. Organizational structure is the patterns of relations between individuals. Organizational structure is related to organizational rationality, efficiency, effectiveness and control systems. 

Rationality connects individuals with organizations. Rationality is the reasoning behind individual behavior. Individual rationality is dependent upon one's position within the organizational structure. For example, a janitor may see coffee spilled all over the floor. This would likely cause the janitor to reason it is her job to clean it up and take actions to do so. On the other hand, a manager may see coffee spilled all over the floor. This would likely cause the manager to reason it is not her job to clean it up but she should report it to someone to get the janitor to handle it. In short, organizational structure affects rationality and individual behavior. 

Organizational structure affects the behavior of individuals in organizations completing purposeful tasks to achieve a collective goal. As such, organizational structure also effects the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations. The effectiveness of an organization is the adequacy of the organization in achieving its desired goal. On the other hand, efficiency is the extent to which resources are minimized and outputs maximized in the pursuit of achieving the desired goals. Whereas effectiveness focuses on just the end outcome, efficiency focuses on economizing the means by which the group achieves their goal. Formal rationality, scientific management, human relations theory and decision making theory each address efficiency and effectiveness, as researchers search for the best form of social organization. However, the consistency of individual rationality and the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations is dependent upon control systems built into the organizational structure.

Control is the power to determine individual behavior. Control systems are built into organizational structures in order to influence individual rationality, maintain consistency and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations. As such, control is a critical aspect of formal rationality, scientific management, human relations theory and decision making theory. 

Although formal rationality, scientific management, human relations theory and decision making theory each address issues of rationality, effectiveness, efficiency and control in organizations, they all have different assumptions which leads to completing claims about how organizations work and effect on individuals. 

Weber's concept of formal rationality is developed in his pursuit of answering the research question: How do formal organizations work? In order to answer this question, Weber uses ideal types. An ideal type is a mental construct that facilitates understanding not because it reflects the empirical world in precise detail, but because it reflects the salient and conspicuous features of the real world. Weber's claim about how organizations work can be understood through his definition of the ideal types of authority, bureaucracy and officials. 

Weber describes three different ideal types of authority: legal rational authority, charismatic authority and traditional authority (Weber 1970). Unlike charismatic authority and traditional authority, legal rational authority is impersonal- authority is not tied to the individual but their position within a formal organization.  According to Weber, modern society is increasingly characterized by legal-rational authority, which increases the importance and prevalence of bureaucracies and officials (Weber 1970). 

From the formal rationality perspective, the most prevalent organizational structure in modern society is the bureaucracy. According to Weber (1970), the bureaucratic ideal type consists of different characteristics: (1) Bureaucracies have rules and regulations and the authority to give commands and designate official duties, (2) Bureaucracies are hierarchical with ordered authority and  the ability to manage turn-over, (3) Bureaucracies consist of formal written documentation of activities, thus establishing an organizational history, (4) Bureaucracies are made up of bureaucratic managers who are experts and receive specialized training, (5) Bureaucracies are ideally operating at full working capacity, and (6) Bureaucratic managers are subject to a set of stable and learnable rules. In short, from this perspective, organizations are characterized by bureaucracies and bureaucratic managers (i.e., officials).

According to formal rationality, bureaucracies are maintained by officials. From Weber's (1970) ideal type, officials are individuals pursuing a career within a bureaucracy with the following characteristics: (1) Officials have social prestige compared to the governed, (2) Officials are appointed by a superior with bureaucratic authority, (3) Officials receive life-tenure, (4) Officials receive compensation through a fixed salary, and (5) Officials are set for a lifelong career advancing thin the hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy. From the formal rationality perspective, modern organizations work as systems of legal-rational authority maintained by officials.  

Although Weber's theory of bureaucracies focuses on formal, legal-rational aspects of organizations which affect individual rationality, according to Weber, rationality consists of both formal and substantive rationality. Formal rationality is the written rules and regulations guiding individual behavior, whereas substantive rationality is the group value orientations that guide behavior. Although Weber's ideal type of bureaucracies emphasizes the formal rational aspects affecting individual behavior, this does not mean he believed individuals in bureaucracies are not influenced by value orientations. This is because ideal types to not reflect the empirical world in detail, they just represent the salient and conspicuous characteristics of empirical reality.  

According to Weber, bureaucracies are currently the most efficient and effective form of social organization. Whereas traditional and charismatic authority systems allows for personal relations to affect the treatment of individuals within organizations, the ideal bureaucratic type promotes equal treatment and universalism (Perrow 1986). Bureaucracies have technical advantages, as they ensure continity and reduce personal friction. 

From the formal rational perspective, organizations are systems of control through formal rational means. Organizational control is ensured through the development of the bureaucratic structure and maintained through formal lines of authority, formal lines of communication and information flow between those two lines (McNeil 1978). Organizations control individual behavior by setting individuals in formal roles within the organizational hierarchy, controlling how they communicate with others based on their position and influencing what information they receive. Control systems emerge as formal rational tools helping organizations achieve their goals and they expand along with the bureaucratic structure. For example, after facing problems with employee turnover or inconsistency of employees in completing the same task , a company might create standard operating procedures, which is a set of rules and regulations determining precisely how tasks should be completed. Control systems influence the rationality of officials in regards to precisely how and when to complete tasks and can be used to increase organizational efficiency. In short, from the formal rational perspective, bureaucracies work as a control system of written rules and regulations which determine the behavior of officials. 

Whereas Weber focuses on how organizations work, scientific management scholars focus on how organizational control can increase the productivity and efficiency of organizations. Since scientific management views organizations as instruments of production, they tend to focus on the production process aspect of the organizational structure. The production process is the observed patterns and ways of work. Scientific management scholars assume the work process can be broken down and quantified. Managers can internally control the production process and, through economic incentives and formal controls, influence worker rationality in order to increase organizational efficiency (Taylor 1970). Like formal rationality, scientific management assumes organizational structure exists to advance collective goals.

Scientific management also makes certain assumptions about rationality in organizations. However, scientific management assumptions of rationality are very different from Weber. Weber sees rationality as both substantive and formal, whereas scientific management theory does not acknowledge substantive rationality. Under scientific management, rationality is strictly viewed through a positivist lens, where things are assumed to be able to be unbiased, calculable and comparable. Scientific management focuses on the formal aspects of organizations and does not account for the substantive values associated with human rationality. 

Like Weber, scientific management sees bureaucratic control as an instrument to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations. However, scientific management tends to focus on organizational efficiency over organizational effectiveness. According to Taylor (1970), managers have the responsibility to ensure organizational efficiency by controlling the labor process. Managers can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations through scientific management principles applied to maximize worker incentive. In short, from the scientific management perspective, managers should determine and quantify all of the factors influencing the production process and use scientific tests to formally arrange the production process in a way that maximizes organizational efficiency. 

Whereas formal rationality focuses on the way formal rules and regulations control the behavior of individuals in organizations, scientific management focuses on the way managers can influence the formal rules and regulations which determine individual behavior. From the scientific management perspective, organizational control can be ensured by managers through the scientific management of the work process. Control systems emerge as a result of management efforts to increase efficiency. Control systems are maintained by managers and are used to influence individual rationality and motivate workers to increase their productivity. In conclusion, from this perspective, organizations work due to managerial control of the production process.

Like scientific management theorists, human relations theorists address questions of how to increase organizational efficiency. However, whereas formal rationality and scientific management focus on the formal aspects affecting the behavior of individuals in organizations, human relations theorists address questions of how informal relationships effect organizations. In short, unlike scientific management, the human relations model addresses the impact of substantive rationality developed in working groups on human behavior. 

From the human relations theory perspective, organizations are systems with formal and informal structures. Furthermore, informal structures have more impact on the rationality of individuals in the organization than formal structures. Organizations are made up of working groups with goals, relationships and processes which differ from the formal structure of the organization. Norms are not strictly defined by managers but they emerge within working groups. Furthermore, status is not formally given but informally obtained (Burroway 1984).  Individuals become attached to certain values which influence group performance and organizational output (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1970). 

Whereas scientific management focuses on the power of managers to influence worker productivity through the administration of formal rules and regulations guiding the work process, human relations theory focuses on both the power of working groups and managers to influence worker productivity by determining the culture of informal groups. Human relations theorists assume that groups and individuals are important to increase productivity, because power comes from the bottom up (Barnard 1970). Cooperation among working groups is essential because it gives power to those higher up in the organization. Organizational inefficiency and ineffectiveness develops when conflict arises from incongruence between the formal and informal structures of organizations (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1970). Since working groups influence informal structures contributing to the behavior of workers in the organization, it is critical to include the actions and cultures of workers when studying the factors related to organizational efficiency and effectiveness. However, human relations theory still holds a managerial bias, meaning workers are viewed as manipulable by management for the aim of increasing organizational effectiveness. 

Human relations theory critiques scientific management measures of the work processes related to organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Scientific management attempts to break down and quantify the work processes related to organizational output. Human relations theory claims it is not possible to break down and quantify all of the factors related to organizational effectiveness and efficiency. Instead, it assumes that the sum is greater than the parts and it is not possible to reduce group characteristics to the characteristics of individual tasks. 

Whereas scientific management and formal rationality focus on the formal aspects of control systems, human relations theory focuses on the informal aspects. From the human relations perspective, control systems emerge within informal working groups, are influenced by both formal and informal processes and consist of norms and beliefs influencing individual behavior. Organizational control can be ensured by management through the establishment of benefits initiated to influence worker norms and beliefs such that cooperation and company loyalty among working groups is increased. From this perspective, informal and formal control systems influence individual beliefs and rationality and determine how organizations and individuals in organizations work. 

Decision making theory primarily addresses how situational organizational structures impact decisions. According to decision making theorists, decision making is not centered around efficiency; things are done in particular ways because that is how it was done in the past. Contradictions and irrationality are prevalent within organizations. Decision makers are limited because of their perceptions and inability to adequately obtain and assess information (March and Simon 1958). Perceptions are bias and bounded by sense-making determined by previous experience and knowledge (Weick 1970). For this reason, organizational history is vital to understanding the behavior of individuals within organizations. 

From the decision making perspective, organizational structure is fluid, as it must be enacted each moment as individuals must continuously perceive and make sense of the world around them. However, sense making is limited due to bounded rationality (i.e., limits in information and constraints on individuals to adequately assess information). According to decision making theory, organizations are made up of a mix of goals, problems and possible solutions (Levitt and Naas 1989). In order to ensure routine behavior in organizations, programs are developed. Programs are routinized activities in response to frequently experienced stimuli. Programs facilitate, yet limit worker understanding. Programs increase understanding, as they evoke meaning to common experiences. However, programs limit understanding, as they focus attention to some events, while ignoring others. Organizations affect individual rationality through programs which influence individual attention and subgoals along with the division of labor and communication structures. 

Whereas scientific management and human relations focus on managerial decisions to increase efficiency, decision making theory focuses on effectiveness. Decision making theorists claim decisions are usually determined by effectiveness, not efficiency (March and Simon 1958). Individuals tend to routinize their behavior and develop programs in response to stimuli.  It is costly for actors to have efficiency involved when making decisions. Instead, actors tend to think of effectiveness when completing tasks- they just worry about getting the job done.

Decision making theory strongly contrasts with both the scientific management and human relations theory. Decision making theory strongly criticizes the managerial bias, as it claims it is not possible for mangers to control the work process. From this perspective, control systems are situated (Vaughn 1998). Control systems emerge as a result of past decisions and other's interpretation of responses, they cannot be determined by current management. All individuals in the organization, including managers, face bounded rationality. As such, everyone within the organization is constrained in their ability to adequately assess information and control organizational outcomes. 

Decision making theory builds from formal rational perspectives of organizations, but according to decision making theory, formal rationality only has half of the equation. Whereas formal rationality emphasizes how organizational control is ensured through a focus of information, decision making theory emphasizes how both the focus of information and the focus of attention is related to organizational control (March and Simon 1958). Historically developed control systems (i.e., programs) influence the way individuals decide when and how to act when experiencing particular stimuli. In conclusion, according to decision making theory, organizations work as sets of continuously enacted programed responses, allowing worker discretion and flexibility in how a mix of goals is achieved. 

As you can see, many theorists have addressed issues of rationality, efficiency and effectiveness. Each theory has its different claims regarding how to ensure organizational control, how organizational control systems emerge, and the effect of control systems on individuals and the organizational structures differently. Although there are similarities between Weber’s concept of formal rationality, scientific management theory, human resource theory, and decision making theory, there are also many differences.

Barnard, Chester. 1970. "Cooperation." Pp. 84-97 in The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies by Oscar Grusky and George Miller (eds.). The Free Press: New York, NY.

Burroway, Michael. 1984. "Organizing Concent on the Shop Floor: The Game of Making Out." Pp. 134-143 in Critical Studies in Organization and Bureaucracy by Frank Fischer and Carmen Sirianni (eds.). Temple University Press: Philadelphia,PA.


Grusky, Oscar and George Miller (eds). 1981. The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies. Second Edition. New York, NY: Free Press.

Levitt, Barbara and Clifford Nass. 1989. “The Lid on the Garbage Can: Institutional Constraints on Decision-Making in the Technical Core of College-Text Publishers.” Administrative Science Quarterly 34:190–207.

March, James and Herbert Simon. 1958. “Cognitive Limits on Rationality.” Pp. 136-171 in Organizations. New York, NY: Wiley-Blackwell.

McNeil, Kenneth. 1978. “Understanding Organizational Power: Building on the Weberian Legacy.” Administrative Science Quarterly 23:65–90.

Perrow, Charles. 1986. Complex Organizations, 3rd Edition. New York: Random House.

Roethlisberger, Fritz and William Dickson. 1970. "Human Relations." Pp. 67-83 in The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies by Oscar Grusky and George Miller (eds.). The Free Press: New York, NY.

Taylor, Frederick. 1970. "Scientific Management." Pp. 55-66 in The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies by Oscar Grusky and George Miller (eds.). The Free Press: New York, NY.

Vaughn, Diane. 1998.  “Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations.” Law & Society Review 32:23–61.

Weber, Max. 1970. "Bureaucracy." Pp. 7-36 in The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies by Oscar Grusky and George Miller (eds.). The Free Press: New York, NY.

Weick, Karl. 1970. "Enactment and Organizing." Pp. 265-279 in The Sociology of Organizations: Basic Studies by Oscar Grusky and George Miller (eds.). The Free Press: New York, NY.

Uncertainty, risk and wrongdoing are key distinct but interrelated concepts in organizational sociology. Uncertainty always creates risk for organizations and risk can result in organizational wrongdoing. In order to fully understand wrongdoing, uncertainty, and risk must also be understood.

Every organization faces uncertainty, as they do not control all of the factors related to their survival. Uncertainty is when knowledge of the nature, extent and probability of outcomes is limited. Since organizations depend on their external environment to survive, every organization faces some degree of uncertainty. Uncertainty makes it impossible for organizations to always accurately predict outcomes. Even when organizations develop technologies meant to reduce uncertainty, they are never 100% accurate and there can be adverse consequences (Holzer and Millo 2005). Uncertainty always creates risk for capitalist organizations competing for resources because outcomes are uncertain.

Risk is a situation in which their is unknown exposure to danger. According to Holzer and Millo (2005:223), uncertainty is a fundamental aspect of risk: "risk refers to fundamental uncertainty: at the time of risk taking, one cannot know for sure whether the opportunity concerned will be realized; in the worst case, the costs incurred might be greater than any benefit." In short, uncertainty is an inherent part of risk.

Uncertainty is not the only factor related to exposure to risk, so is resource access. One's conception of risk is related to conflict over resources and the balance of power (Dietz, Stern and Rycroft 1989). Due to actions of powerful actors, those with less resources tend to remain uncertain of their risk exposure and pay the consequences of the risky decisions made by those in positions of power (Auyero and Swistun 2008). Since power and conflict are other aspects associated with risk, risk can lead to wrongdoing.

As explained in a previous post, wrongdoing is behavior that results in the violation of the law, a written or unwritten code of ethics, or social responsibility doctrines which are monitored and enforced (Palmer 2012). Not all risk leads to wrongdoing, but all wrongdoing is related to risk, as it is not possible to always accurately predict the consequences of wrongful behavior. As such, it is important to understand exactly how organizations will attempt to manage risk and develop structures which promote wrongdoing. 

In order to better manage risk, organizations will develop differential social structures which facilitate wrongdoing. Two key factors facilitating wrongdoing include organizational complexity (Beamish 2000) and resource dependence (Prechel and Morris 2010). For example, Beamish (2000) found intra-organizational complexity, hierarchies and subcultures led to Unocal Corporation spilling over 20 million gallons of petroleum into California's Guadalupe Dunes. On the other hand, Prechel and Morris (2010) found in an attempt to manage uncertainties and capital dependence, corporate actors initiated strategies and structures which created incentives and opportunities for corporate malfeasance. In short, to cope with uncertainty and resource dependence, organizations develop structures which provides opportunities and incentives for wrongful behavior. 

Although uncertainty, risk, and wrongdoing are all theoretically distinct concepts, they are interrelated. Wrongdoing creates and can be the result of risk. Furthermore, risk creates uncertainty and uncertainty creates risk. It is important to understand the differences between the three concepts to fully understand organizational wrongdoing. ​

Auyero, Javieer and Debora Swistun. 2008. “The Social Production of Toxic Uncertainty.” American Sociological Review 73(3): 357-379.

Beamish, Thomas. 2000. “Accumulating Trouble: Complex Organization, a Culture of Silence, and a Secret Spill.” Social Problems 47(4): 473-498.

Dietz, T, PC Stern and RW Rycroft. 1989. “Definitions of Conflict and the Legitimization of Resources: The Case of Environmental Risk.” Sociological Forum 4(1): 47-70.

Holzer, Boris and Yuval Millo. 2005. “From Risks to Second-Order Dangers in Financial Markets: Unintended Consequences of Risk Management Systems.” New Political Economy 10:223–245.

Palmer, Donald. 2012. Normal Organizational Wrongdoing: A Critical Analysis of Theories of Misconduct in and by Organizations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Gerald R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper and Row.

Prechel, Harland and Theresa Morris. 2010. “The Effects of Organizational and Political Embeddedness on Financial Malfeasance in the Largest U.S. Corporations: Dependence, Incentives and Opportunities.” American Sociological Review 75:331–354.
​

​Organizational wrongdoing is a major social problem, both in the United States and around the world. Organizational wrongdoing is wrongful behavior conducted in and by formal organizations.  Wrongful behavior is behavior that results in the violation of the law, a written or unwritten code of ethics, or social responsibility doctrines which are monitored and enforced (Palmer 2012). Examples of organizational wrongdoing include financial malfeasance, dumping toxic waste, misappropriation of funds and unfair promotions. Organizational wrongdoing includes a large range of behavior which significantly impacts material access and the everyday lives of so many people. Since it is such a significant social problem, it is critical for the causes of organizational wrongdoing to be understood. 

There are two competing perspectives of organizational wrongdoing: wronging as an abnormal phenomenon and wrongdoing as a normal phenomenon (Palmer 2012). One perspective (organizational wrongdoing as an abnormal phenomenon) sees wrongdoing as an act of deviance within the organization. The other perspective (organizational wrongdoing as a normal phenomenon) sees wrongdoing as a typical act within the organization. By building from two different foundations of thought, the two competing perspectives both attempt to explain why organizational wrongdoing occurs.

​From the rational choice perspective, people in organizations act wrongfully due to a rational cost-benefit analysis. According to this perspective, organizational wrongdoing is the result of problematic organizational incentive structures which motivates wrongful behavior. Two main theories stem from the rational choice account of wrongdoing: agency theory and strain theory. 

Agency theory is a perspective rooted in economics. According to this perspective, economic relationships are made up of principals and agents. Principals are individuals who pay others for their labor. An example of a principal would be a stockholder who provides investment funds to a company whose managers are expected to use the investments to make a profit. Agents are individuals who are paid to perform work. An example of an agent would be a corporate manager who receives a salary for managing a company. From this perspective, increased divisions between principals and agents has resulted in organizational wrongdoing. Both principals and agents act opportunistically, even at the expense of the other. According to agency theory, organizational wrongdoing occurs when social structures create incentives for agents to act opportunistically at the expense of principals. For example, Berle and Means (1932) claim the dispersion of stock ownership has misaligned the interests of stock holders (principals) with the interests of corporate managers (agents). As a result, wrongful behavior, like earnings manipulation and personal use of company resources, occurs (Fama and Jensen 1983). 

Whereas agency theory focuses on principals and agents, strain theory focuses on legitimacy (i.e., socially accepted use of power). Strain theory is a perspective rooted in sociology. According to this perspective, individuals pursue illegitimate means (i.e., ways that are not socially accepted) to achieve goals when they cannot achieve their goals legitimately (Agnew 1985). For example, an individual in a competitive environment might not be capable of achieving their career aspirations. This could result in individuals seeking illegitimate means, like earnings manipulation, to better achieve their interests. 

Whereas the rational account perspective focuses on the rational/formal aspects affecting individual decision making, the cultural account focuses on the irrational/normative aspects. From the cultural perspective, people in organizations act wrongfully not because of rational cost-benefit calculations but because of cultural norms, values and beliefs within the organization. Organizational cultures affect individual assumptions about empirical reality and can directly or indirectly promote wrongful behavior. Ashforth, Anad and Joshi (2004) identify six ways in which perverse organizational cultures can promote/legitimize wrongdoing: (1) denial of responsiblity, (2) denial of injury, (3) denial of victim, (4) social weighting, (5) appeal to higher loyalties, and (6) balancing the ledger. Through the socialization process, individuals come to embrace perverse organizational cultures that promote/legitimize wrongdoing. For example, the torture of Arabs by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib was facilitated by group cultures to follow the line of command and dehumanize detainees. In short, according to this perspective, organizational wrongdoing is the result of problematic cultures within organizations which motivates wrongful behavior. ​

​Studies of ethical decision bridge the gap between normal/abnormal perspectives of organizational wrongdoing. From the ethical decision perspective, people in organizations act wrongfully due to limitations in the decision making process. According to this perspective, organizations are made up of individuals with different tasks, who when properly coordinated, work to achieve a set goal. Individuals within organizations collect information on how to best achieve their tasks. From this perspective, organizational wrongdoing is the result of individuals failing to process ethical criteria when making a decision. The main issues emerging from the ethical decision account of wrongdoing include bounded rationality, bounded ethicality, multiple ethical decisions and cognitive dissonance.

Bounded rationality is the cognitive limits of humans to acquire, store, process and retrieve information. Since individuals face limits to their knowledge, their behavior cannot be a rational calculation of costs and benefits; it must be constrained by what they know (March and Simon 1958). As such, individual decisions are limited by the factors contributing to what they know.

Bounded ethicality is the cognitive limits of ethical decision makers. Due to bounded rationality, individuals have poor conceptions of the contributing factors and consequences of ethical decisions. For example, individuals tend to underestimate the range of those affected by their ethical decisions and disregard the consequences of their actions (Chugh, Banaji and Bazerman 2005). Individuals in organizations face problems when making ethical decisions because their decisions are limited by their inaccurate decision frames. 

Another problem organizational decision makers face when making ethical decisions is that they have to make multiple, linked decisions. As such, ethical decisions develop over time and are affected by temporal processes. For example, Jordan, Mullen and Murnighan (2011) find individuals attempt to maintain their ethical identities by creating a balance of ethical versus unethical decisions: a person who identifies herself as ethical makes an unethical decision may attempt to make up for it by making more ethical decisions in the future and person who identifies herself as unethical that makes a ethical decision may attempt to make up for it by making more unethical decisions in the future. Furthermore, the temporal aspects of decision making create problems of layering. A decision made at one point of time lays the foundation for future decisions. These complexities limit individual decisions and can lead to organizational wrongdoing. 

Ethical decision making is further limited by cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is the way individuals tend to rationalize their behavior (Aronson 1973). Individuals may interpret their behavior as the result of rational or normative decisions, however, their behavior suggests it must be something else. For example, an individual who commits malfeasance may rationalize their behavior as the result of cost/benefit analysis or cultural norms, when their decision is really characterized by uncertainty, complexity and inadequate information. By rationalizing the behavior, the issues of uncertainty, complexity and inadequate information systems are not addressed, thus reifying the process contributing to unethical decisions.

From the ethical decision account, wrongdoing can be conceptualized as either a normal or abnormal phenomenon.  Wrongdoers can be seen as perverse. From this perspective, perverse individuals may disregard the consequences of their actions and fail to process ethical criteria when making decisions. On the other hand, wrongdoers can be seen as normal, good people. Also from this perspective, normal individuals facing uncertainty, complexity and inadequate information may fail to process ethical criteria when making decisions resulting in wrongdoing. In this way, the ethical decision account serves as a bridge between normal and abnormal perspectives of organizational wrongdoing. 

Wrongdoing as a normal phenomenon assumes wrongdoing is unremarkable and wrongdoers are ordinary (Palmer 2012). The causes of wrongdoing include pervasive social structures and processes (Palmer 2012). In short, from this perspective, organizational wrongdoing is seen as a typical behavior. The five major accounts stemming from this perspective include: the administrative system account, the social situational influence account, the power structure account, the accidental behavior account and the social control account (Palmer 2012). ​

​Administrative systems theory draws from the ethical decision account of wrongdoing. Specifically, it draws from March and Simon's (1958) concept of bounded rationality. From the administrative systems theory account, organizations are made up of individuals with different tasks, who when properly coordinated, work to achieve a set goal. However, since individuals face bounded rationality and complex environments, organizations require adequate coordination to be effective. Administration systems help individuals in organizations manage problems of bounded rationality and complex environments. 

Administrative structures include obtrusive and unobtrusive controls (Perrow 1972). Unobtrusive controls are implicit guidelines on how to complete a task. An example of an unobtrusive control is norms learned at professional meetings. Obtrusive controls are more explicit guidelines on how to complete a task. An example of an obtrusive control is set standard operating procedures to assist in decision making. Obtrusive and unobtrusive controls are used to coordinate behavior and influence the actions of individuals within the organization. 

From the administrative theory perspective organizational wrongdoing is the result of obtrusive and unobtrusive controls which program unethical behavior. For example, a well operator may choose to dispose of fracking fluid in a way that endangers water sources due to standard operating procedures and professional norms. In this way, organizational wrongdoing is conceptualized as a normal event, programmed by design. 

​The situational social influence account of wrongdoing draws from human relations theory, which focuses on the informal aspects influencing productivity. From this perspective, social context (group dynamics, informal norms and goals) primarily influences individual behavior (Barnard 1938). Informal norms shape attitudes of how individuals in particular roles should act, how people in general should treat one another and how members of informal groups should be related (Palmer 2012). As such, situational social influence is critical to understand the behavior of individuals within organizations. 

Individual acts of wrongdoing can be the thoughtless acts resulting from situational social influence. For example, group norms of efficiency and confidence in the effectiveness of the production process may push individuals to thoughtlessly create a safety compliance report, later resulting in a defective product and recalls. Group norms can promote thoughtless behavior and result in organizational wrongdoing.

​From the power structure account, organizations are power structures made up of formal  and informal authority relations. Formal authority is the set power relations and hierarchies within organizations. From this perspective, organizational wrongdoing is the result of organizational power structures including formal authority and resource dependence. 

The formal authority associated with organizations can contribute to organizational wrongdoing. The Milgram experiment (1963) is a famous study demonstrating how formal authority can result in wrongdoing. The experiment had participants use a button to "shock" a learner who answered a question incorrectly, with the severity of the shock increasing over time (however, there really was no person they were shocking). Milgram found at the order of lab managers, participants would be willing to inflict deathly shocks upon others. In short, formal authority results in subordinates obeying the commands of those in positions of authority, even when the subordinate believes the behavior is wrong. 

Furthermore, informal power resulting from resource dependence can result in organizational wrongdoing. Organizations need resources to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Members in organizations who control the resources needed to survive and cope with the uncertainty associated with the external environment have informal power. As such, individuals are motivated to accumulate power and are influenced by informal goals associated with being perceived to be in control of managing critical contingencies facing the organization. For example, in order to acquire informal power, individuals in organizations can withhold or manipulate information to shape others perceptions of critical environmental contingencies facing the organization. Informal power resulting from resource dependence is problematic because the strategies used to accumulate informal power resulting from resource dependence typically are associated with norm violations and organizational wrongdoing. 

​The accidental behavior account of wrongdoing draws from the administrative systems account. Like the administrative systems account, the accidental behavior account of wrongdoing claims wrongdoing can be the result of accidents occurring due to inadequate organizational design. For example, Vaughan's (1996) study of the Challenger disaster finds inadequate system designs can result in catastrophic accidents. Technologies and structures of production create information deficiencies resulting in accidents and wrongdoing.

From the accidental behavior perspective of wrongdoing, wrongdoing is the result of information processing deficits. Information processing deficits can result in organizational accidents and wrongdoing when individuals do not have or cannot process the information necessary to understand the wrongful character of their actions. Individuals in organizations may attempt to pursue rightful objectives, but accidentally achieve wrongful outcomes.

Wrongdoing and accidents are different, but related concepts. Accidents are unintentional outcomes. On the other hand, wrongdoing is an outcome that violates law, ethics or social responsibility doctrines. Accidents are related to wrongdoing in three ways. According to Palmer (2012:238-240): "First, wrongdoing can facilitate accidents... Second, accidents can facilitate wrongdoing...Third, accidents can lead to the detection of unrelated wrongdoing...Fourth, accidents can lead to broader definitions of wrongdoing, which create the possibility of new forms of wrongdoing in the future." Although wrongdoing and accidents are distinct concepts, they are related.

From this perspective, accidents can not always be remedied by improving defunct administrative systems. Instead, normal accidents are likely to occur in organizational structures that are tightly coupled and complex (Perrow 2007). Tightly coupled systems are organizational structures made up of highly interdependent parts. An example of a tightly coupled system is a rocket engine where the functioning of its parts are interrelated and dependent upon the adequate operation of other parts. An example of a loosely coupled system is the education system which is made up of separate, highly autonomous districts. Complex systems are structures with numerous related parts. An example of a complex system is NASA, which is made up of numerous relationships between of numerous groups and contract groups. An example of a simple system is a self-employed plumber: there is the plumber, the supply store and her clients, so the production process requires few groups to be involved. Organizational structures that are tightly coupled and complex cannot be remedied; under these conditions, normal accidents are inevitable. 

​Like the cultural account, the social control account of wrongdoing examines the influence of organizational culture on wrongdoing. However, from this perspective, wrongdoers are not perverse, instead, wrongdoing is the result of the relationship between social control agents and organizational participants. Social control agents have incentives to punish individuals who act wrongfully, while at the same time, they attempt to avoid punishment. This creates conflict and influences wrongdoing.

The interaction between social control agents and individuals in organizations results in first order and second order wrongdoing. First order wrongdoing is how social control agents have the power to directly develop formal rules for organizational participants which can make it more possible for individuals to act wrongfully. An example of first order wrongdoing is the ability of politicians to write laws that deregulate the banking industry, decreasing oversight of banking transactions and making it easier for traders to commit fraud. Second order wrongdoing is wrongful behavior that would not have been possible without previous interactions between social control agents and organizational participants. An example of second order wrongdoing is Martha Stewart who violated laws of impeding an investigation in the processes of defending herself from allegations of insider trading. the ability of social control agents generate group pressures. She wouldn't have violated laws of impeding an investigation, had it not been her interactions with federal investigators. In short, wrongful behavior depends on the relationship between social control agents and organizational participants. 

​Agnew, R. 1985. "A Revised Strain Theory of Delinquency." Social Forces 64:151-167.

Aronson, E. 1973. "The Raionalizing Animal." PP. 131-138 in Staw, B (ed.), Psychological Dimensions of Organizational Behavior, Second Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice Hall. 

Ashforth, B.E., V. Anand and M. Joshi 2004. "Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in Organizations." Academy of Management Executive 18:39-53. 

Barnard, C. 1938. The Function of the Executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 

Berle, Adolf and Gardiner Means. [1932] 1991. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Chugh, D. M. Banaji and M. Bazerman. 2005. "Bounded ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing Conflicts of Interest." PP. 74-95 in Moore, D., D. Cain, G. Loewenstein, and M. Bazerman (eds.) Conflicts of Interest: Problems and Solutions from Law, Medicine and Organizational Settings. London, UK: Cambridge University Press. 

Fama E.F. and M.C. Jensen. 1983. "The Separation of Ownership and Control. " Journal of Law and Economics 26:301-325. 

Jordan, J.M., E. Mullen and J.K. Murnighan. 2011. "Striving for the Moral Self: The Effects of Recalling Past Moral Actions on Future Moral Behavior." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 37: 701-713. 

March, J.G. and H. Simon. 1958. Organizations. John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY. 

Milgram, S. 1963. "Behavioral Study of Obedience." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 67: 371-378. 

Palmer, Donald. 2012. Normal Organizational Wrongdoing: A Critical Analysis of Theories of Misconduct in and by Organizations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 

Perrow,  C. B. 1972. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 

Perrow, C.B. 2007. The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial and Terrorist Disasters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 

Pfeffer, J. and G.R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers. 

Vaughan, D. 1996. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 

Within the field of political sociology, there has been a debate between state-centered and society-centered perspectives of how public policy is formed. State-centered perspectives contend that state managers and structures determine political outcomes. Society-centered theories, on the other hand, conclude that social forces external to the state determine political outcomes. The assumptions of the competing perspectives affect their analyses and conclusions. Historical contingency theory is able to overcome the problematic assumptions of the competing perspectives and resolve the debate by treating the power of the state and society as variables affected by historical factors. ​

State-centered theories claim the actions of state managers and state structures constitute the policy formation process (Block 1980). The state has the power to transcend class structures (Block 1977). The interests of state managers are not the same as capitalists (Block 1980). State managers seek to improve their position, sometimes using their political power to act against the capitalist class. As such, the state cannot be reduced to the interests of social classes external to the state. 

From the state-centered perspective, the state is able to hold the most political power because they are not faced with the same forces of competition as the capitalist class (Block 1980). The capitalist class isn't cohesive because capitalists have competing interest. Due to the bureaucratic role of state managers, they are the group most likely to act cohesively (Block 1980). State managers are professionals with technical expertise seeking a career within a bureaucracy which has written rules and goals (Weber 1946). They are also members of a professional network with shared interests, which facilitates class consciousness. Since state mangers have technical expertise, shared interest and class consciousness, they control the policy formation process.

Since state-centered theorists assume state managers and structures determine public policy, they focus on the actions of state managers and state structures (Evans, Reuschemeyerand Skocpol 1985; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988). For example, Hooks (1990) conducts a historical comparative analysis of the USDA during separate time periods, focusing on state structures. He finds state structures established during World War II played a major role in the perpetuating the influence of the American Farm Bureau Federation to influence the USDA during the post-war period. Other state-centered theorists examine the influence of state structures on social outcomes. For instance, Dobbin (1992) finds the rise of fringe benefits is related to the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act. State structures provided benefits for corporations to adopt pension programs. In short, state-centered research focuses on the influence of state structures on policy outcomes. 

By focusing just on state managers and state structures, state-centered perspectives are limited. State-centered perspectives largely ignore the actions of groups external to the state. By only examining data regarding the actions and structures within the state, the data can only led to the conclusion that the state constitutes the political process, independent from external social forces. 

From the society-centered perspective, the actions and interests of groups external to the state constitute the policy formation process. This perspective maintains that the state is reflective of external group interests. Key society-centered perspectives include elite theory, class theory and pluralism.

Elite theory claims an inner circle of business elites control the political process. Elite theorists have demonstrated how in individual races, business elites act cohesively; they follow similar corporate PAC giving strategies (Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden 1986). Corporate PACs are powerful political tools which provide capitalist elites with disproportionate access and influence in the political process (Clawson, Neustadtl and Scott 1992) . The political behavior of individual capitalists is influenced by class faction and inner-circle membership (Burris 2001). The cohesive political action of the business elites is facilitated by indirect interlocking through finance institutions along with direct interlocks of board of directors (Mizruchi 1989). Business elites with long-term relationships with the state (e.g., oil producing and aerospace firms) politically unify to manage resource dependence (Mizruchi 1987) and minimize uncertainty (Boies 1989). Furthermore, elite social movement organizations shape the political process (Boies and Pichardo 1993). In short, although they may have competing interests, an inner circle of capitalist elites acts cohesively to control the political process.  

According to class theory, the state is relatively autonomous (Poulantzas 1973). From this perspective, the structure of the state is embedded within the economic structure, determined by capitalist class contradictions and conflict. For example, Quadagno (1984) demonstrates how the Social Security Act of 1935 is the result of competing class factions forming a power bloc necessary to control the political process.  From this perspective, the state is a mediating body, negotiating the interests of competing class factions while implementing working-class demands within capitalist terms.

Whereas class theory and elite theory emphasize the power of economic elites, pluralists contend the power of economic elites is low because they are divided due to competition. From the pluralist perspective, the state serves as a mediator between numerous competing interest groups. No single group dominates the political process. 

There are benefits and pitfalls associated with society-centered perspectives. Since society-centered theorists assume social forces influence the state, their analysis tends to include the actions of groups internal and external to the state. For example, Quadagno's (1990) historical case study of Nixon's proposal for a Family Assistance Plan examines the actions of state managers along with class struggles. Even though society-centered theorists examine the state along with external interest groups, the theory is still limited because it does not explain events when the state is able to act autonomously. There is evidence of historical events when state autonomy has occurred (Evans, Reuschemeyerand Skocpol 1985). For instance, in my study of the Texas oil and gas industry, I found state managers were able to change the application of flaring regulation by reclassifying white-water oil as natural gas and overcome capitalist opposition in the courts. Society-centered perspectives fail to account for these historical events. 

​Drawing from Poulantzas (1973)'s class theory of the state, historical contingency theory conceptualizes the state as a mediating body managing conflict between competing class factions, requiring it to maintain relative autonomy.  The capitalist class is made up of competing class segments with competing interests (Zeitlin, Neuman and Ratcliff 1976). Dominant class segments can unify to create a power bloc and control public policy. From the historical contingency theory perspective, a power bloc is necessary for broad policy shifts to occur; the segments involved and strength of the power bloc varies over time and is historically contingent.

Historical contingency theory emphasizes the historical conditions affecting the distribution of power (Prechel 1990). The autonomy of state managers and dominance of capitalist class factions are viewed as ideal types within a continuum affected by historical conditions (Prechel 1990).  Under particular historical conditions, state autonomy is more prevalent and capitalist control is less prevalent. Under other historical conditions, power blocs are more likely to unify such that capitalist control is more prevalent and state autonomy is less prevalent.

From the historical contingency theory perspective, business unity varies over time (Akard 1992). The historical conditions affecting business power include economic downturns, war and expanding state structures (Prechel 1990). The state and corporations are organizations that need resources and legitimacy to survive. Business political power is related to capital-dependence (Morris 2005). When historical conditions increase capital-dependence and uncertainty (like during economic downturns and war), corporations mobilize around prevailing public policy to form a power bloc necessary to change public policy to better suit capitalist interests. 

Historical contingency theory resolves the state-centered versus society-centered debate by conceptualizing state autonomy and class dominance as ideal types whose explanatory power is influenced by historical conditions. Historical contingency theory emphasizes historical contexts, the state and external interest groups. From this perspective, the state is influenced by its own structure, along with its external environment (Prechel 1991). Historically contingent external conditions are critical to the analysis since the state can be transformed by capitalists and social movements (Quadagno 1992).  In short, historical contingency theory is able to merge state-centered and society-centered perspectives and overcome theoretical shortcomings by emphasizing the state, society and historical context. 

Historical contingency overcomes the state versus society debate among political sociologists. State autonomy and elite domination should be conceptualized as ideal types whose explanatory power varies depending on historical context. As such, it is critical for political sociologists to account for historical context within their analysis. ​

Akard, Patrick. 1992. “Corporate Mobilization and U.S. Economy Policy in the 1970s.” American Sociological Review 57:597–615.

Boies, John. 1989. “Money, Business, and the State: Material Interests, Fortune 500 Corporations, and the Size of Political Action Committees.” American Sociological Review 54:821–833.

Boies, John and Nelson Pichardo. 1993/94. “The Committee on the Present Danger: A Case of the Importance of Elite Social Movement Organizations to Theories of Social Movements and the State.” Berkeley Journal of Sociology 38:57–87.

Block, Fred. 1977. “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State.” Socialist Revolution 33:6–28.

Block, Fred. 1980. “Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects.” Pp. 227–241 in The Sociologist Register, edited by Ralph Miliband and John Saville. London: Merlin Press.

Burris, Val. 2001. “The Two Faces of Capital: Corporations and Individual Capitalists as Political Actors.” American Sociological Review 66:361–381.

Clawson, Dan, Alan Neustadtl, and James Bearden. 1986. “The Logic of Business Unity: Corporate Contributions to the 1980 Congressional Elections.” American Sociological Review 51:797–811.

Clawson, Dan, Alan Neustadtl, and Denise Scott. 1992 . Money Talks: Corporate PACs and Political Influence. New York: Basic.

Dobbin, Frank. 1992. “The Origins of Private Social Insurance: Public Policy and Fringe Benefits in America, 1920–1950.” American Journal of Sociology 97:1416–1450.

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Numerous social scientists have examined how political power is distributed in the United States. Pluralism, which assumes no group holds a monopoly on  political power, is arguably the most influential perspective on the distribution of power in the United States. However, class conceptions of political power (i.e., class theory and elite theory) challenge the pluralist perspective. ​

Pluralism is a popular theory on how political power is distributed in the United States.  From this perspective, there is no single ruling elite. The state is a neutral entity that solves conflict between groups; no particular group controls the state (Lindblom 1982). According to pluralism, public opinion is the result of a combination of interests (Polsby 1960). The actions of elected officials and state managers are reflective of public opinion and negotiations between numerous competing groups. All individuals have the capacity to become politically organized and achieve their political interests (Polsby 1960). Individuals and groups cannot be involved in every issue. As a result, there are numerous different political groups  with competing interests involved in the political process. This creates a low potential for unity among elites (Dahl 1958). Since political effectiveness requires a high potential for both control and unity, elites do not have the power to dominate the political process (Dahl 1958). 

Pluralism studies political power by examining the individuals involved in the decision making process. Pluralist scholars research specific political issues to determine who prevails in community decision making (Polsby 1960). By tracing the concrete decision making process, pluralists examine the extent to which a power structure exists. 

Confronting mounting evidence of the political power of corporate elites, pluralism II attempts to account for the disproportionate influence of corporations. According to pluralism II, corporate political domination still fits within the pluralist model because the corporate enterprise is a social collective (Manley 1983).  While acknowledging the political system needs significant reform due to the power of corporations, pluralists still minimize the importance of class in determining who has political power. 

Unlike pluralism, class conceptions of political power assumes that power is unequally distributed throughout society and a particular group controlling the means of production hold a monopoly on power in the United States. Key class conceptions of political power include elite theory and class theory. Both class conceptions of political power claim the interests of the capitalist class control the political process. 

From the perspective of elite theory, political domination is achieved by an inner circle of ruling elite who maintain positions of control in major social institutions including those of political, economic and military significance (Mills 1956). As modern bureaucracies have developed, power has become increasingly centralized and concentrated. As a result, the structural possibilities for collusion between the major spheres of society significantly increases. Members of the inner circle of the upper class share positions of power in major social institutions. Corporate elites share social networks and are able to use their social networks to shape public opinion and political outcomes (Domhoff 2006). The ruling class is able to dominate the political process because even though individuals within the elite may have competing interests regarding a particular outcome, the capitalist class shares class-consciousness and acts as a cohesive group (Useem 1982). 

According to elite theory, the dominant class is able to control political outcomes due to shared class consciousness (i.e., shared understanding of common economic interests). Class consciousness is achieved through the dominant ideology (Abercrombie and Turner 1978). However, the dominant ideology is not the ideology of the working class. Instead, the dominant ideology is maintained by the capitalist class and serves the function of unifying capitalists. 

Class theory differs from elite theory in two respects: (1) Whereas elite theory focuses on class cohesion, class theory focuses on political outcomes, and (2) Whereas elite theory focuses on a ruling inner circle of the capitalist class, class theory focuses on the entire class structure. 

Elite theorists examine who has power; they analyze the social network which make up the inner circle of the power elite. On the other hand, class theory examines how the ruling class is able to use political power to reproduce class relations (Thernborn 1976). From this perspective, the state is a superstructure related to the economic structure of society (Marx 1982). Capitalist class factions with competing interests are able to mobilize to form a power bloc necessary to push forward pro-capitalist policy (Poulantzas 1973). In short, according to class theory, the capitalist class does not need to be unified in order to achieve political domination. 

Elite theorists focus on the inner circle of the power elite. On the other hand, class theory focuses on the entire capitalist class. From this perspective, the state is related to the entire capitalist structure (i.e., the patterns of relations of class factions) rather than the cohesive interests of the ruling arm of the capitalist class. In short, elite theory examines the structure of an elite group of the capitalist class, and class theory examines the structure of entire capitalist class. 

Pluralism critiques elite theory assumptions of a cohesive capitalist class. According to pluralism, the capitalist class is not unified. However, as explained by class theory, class unity is not necessary for elite interests to be achieved. Furthermore, elite theorists, such as Mizruchi (2013) demonstrate class unity varies over time and is not necessary for elites to influence the political process. As such, elite theory overcomes pluralist critiques. 

Pluralist theorists claim elite theory is problematic because it is not falsifiable. According to Dahl (1957:463):"If the overt leaders of a community do not appear to constitute a ruling elite, then the theory can be saved by arguing that behind the overt leaders there is a set of covert leaders who do." However, this critique is problematic because contemporary elite theory research on the U.S. power structure provides empirical evidence that a social networks of economic actors have a major influence on policies that significantly influence the daily lives of a large amount of people (Domhoff 2013; Domhoff and Dye 1987; Dreiling 2000; Griffin and Wallace 1982; Jenkins and Shumate 1985; Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Mizruchi 2010).  

Pluralists focus on the exercise of power and ignore how power structures influence individual information processing. As a result, pluralist theory is limited. Action is not required for a group to achieve power (Lukes 1974). By controlling information processes, conflict is able to be avoided while achieving group interests over the interests of others.  Ideology influences the way individuals understand the world in which they live and ideology is related to capitalist reproduction (Marx 1982). By focusing on actions and ignoring the influence of capitalist ideology, pluralism fails to recognize the complexity and depth of power. 

Class conceptions of political power challenge pluralist assumptions of the impartial state. Class conceptions assume the state is representative of the interests of the capitalist class. According to elite theory, the inner circle of power elites in dominant political, economic and cultural institutions are able to control the policy formation process. According to class theory, even if elites are not directly involved in the decision making process, the state serves the function of reproducing the capitalist system, as its legitimacy is dependent upon economic growth (Thernborn 1976; Lipset 2994). In short, class conceptions of political power contradict pluralist assumptions of the impartial state by showing how the state is representative of economic interests. 

Pluralism is a critical response to class conceptions of political power which assume a dominant class controls political outcomes in the United States. However, by ignoring the empirical reality that power is not evenly distributed in society, pluralist critiques fail to adequately explain the empirical world. On the other hand, key class conceptions of political power are better able to explain empirical events. ​

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